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A WOLF IN SHEEPS CLOTHING: CHICAGO
PUBLIC SCHOOLS' DISGUISED "FOR
CAUSE" TERMINATION AND THE
DUE PROCESS IMPLICATIONS
BY SHANKAR RAMAMURTHY*
INTRODUCTION
The education of American youth is at the forefront of public
and political debate in the United States. International studies
show that American students are falling behind their interna-
tional peers in math, science and reading assessments., Studies
have also diagnosed poor reading and mathematical skills
among American adults as a cause of America's decline in com-
petitiveness in the global market, having far reaching conse-
quences for the country's status as a global industrial leader. 2 In
response, politicians, non-profit organizations and lobbyists
have sounded the alarm on America's education crisis.3 The so-
lution has been a resolve to place a greater emphasis on review-
* The author is an attorney in Chicago, Illinois, and focuses a part of his
practice on civil rights litigation in the area of education. The opinions ex-
pressed herein are the opinions of the author only and do not necessarily
reflect the opinions of the law firm with which the author is associated or any
of the author's clients.
1 OECD (2014), PISA 2012 Results: What Students Know and Can Do - Stu-
dent Performance in Mathematics, Reading and Science (Vol. 1 Feb. 2014)
available at http://www.oecd.org/pisalkeyfindings/pisa-2012-results-volume-I.
pdf.
2 OECD (2013), OEC Skills Outlook: First Results from the survey of Adult
Skills, OECD available at http://www.oecd.org/site/piaac/Country%20note%
20-%2OUnited%2OStates.pdf.
3 New York Times Editorial Board, Editorial, The United States, Falling Be-
hind, N.Y. TIMES, Ocr. 22, 2013, at A28.
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ing the performance of students, teachers, administrators, and
school districts.4
In 2009, the U.S. Department of Education ("DOE") began
administrating the Race to the Top program. The program gave
the DOE authority to award funds from an allocation of $4.35
billion5 to states adopting certain education initiatives, including
new performance evaluation criteria for teachers, administra-
tors, and districts. 6 46 states and the District of Columbia have
adopted these initiatives in an effort to receive additional gov-
ernment dollars from the program.7 Illinois received $43 million
in Race to the Top grants in 2012 alone.8
The Race to the Top performance standards require the eval-
uation of teachers on the basis of their students' performance on
standardized tests, moving away from the traditional model of
supervisor observations.9 School districts nationwide, including
4 Arne Duncan, Remarks at the National Press Club, Moving Forward, Stay-
ing Focused (Oct. 2, 2012) available at http://www.ed.gov/news/speeches/mov-
ing-forward-staying-focused.
5 Press Release, U.S. Dept. of Educ., President Obama, U.S. Secretary of
Education Duncan Announce Nat'l Competition to Advance School Reform:
Obama Administration Starts $.35 Billion 'Race to the Top' Competition,
Pledges a Total of $10 Billion for Reforms (July 24, 2009 available at http://
www2.ed.gov/news/pressreleases/2009/07/07242009.html.
6 See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., RACE TO THE ToP PANEL REVIEW By AP-
PLICANT FOR ILLINOIS, PHASE I, § D, available at http://www2.ed.gov/pro-
grams/racetothetop/phasel-applications/score-sheets/illinois.pdf.
7 U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., RACE TO THE ToP PHASE 1 FINAL RESULTS (2010),
available at http://www2.ed.gov/programs/racetothetop/phasel-applications/
score-summary.pdf; U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., RACE TO THE ToP PHASE 2 FINAL
RESULTs, available at http://www2.ed.gov/programs/racetothetop/phase2-ap-
plications/summary.pdf; Race to the Top State Reports: Phase 3, U.S. DEP'T
OF EDUC., http://www2.ed.gov/programs/racetothetop/performance.html#
phase-3 (last visited Jan. 6, 2014).
8 U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY SEC'Y, PHASE 3 AWARD
LETTER (Dec. 22, 2011) available at http://www2.ed.gov/programs/racetothe
top/phase3-awards/illinois.pdf.
9 U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., RACE TO THE ToP SCORING RUBRIC, APPENDIX B,
§ IV(D)(2)(ii), (iii), available at http://www2.ed.gov/programs/racetothetop/
scoringrubric.pdf.
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in Chicago, have adopted rating systems that incorporate "value
added" metric analysis ("VAM"). VAM is designed to identify
how much a teacher contributed to the educational growth of a
student from the beginning of a school year to the end of the
school year by comparing students' performance on standard-
ized tests in one classroom to those in another classroom, while
controlling several variables.10 New evaluation models, based on
the requirements of the Race to the Top scoring rubric, award
higher ratings to teachers who contribute to a higher "value ad-
ded" educational growth in their students."
Emphasis on performance comes at a time when municipali-
ties are simultaneously facing large budget deficits, resulting in
extensive personnel cuts.12 In several large school districts, like
in the Chicago Public Schools ("CPS"), decisions on which
teachers to retain during layoffs and reductions in force ("RIF")
are made using these new teacher performance ratings rather
than the traditional standard - years of service (i.e. seniority).13
The intent of using performance ratings to select teachers for
layoff is to award perceived "good" teachers with continued em-
ployment, while quickly removing perceived "bad" teachers
from the system.
In adhering to a performance based model of selecting teach-
ers for layoff, however, school districts have disguised "for
cause" terminations on the basis of deficient performance in the
cloak of a "layoff," ignoring the due process implications of ter-
minating tenured teachers without notice and the opportunity
for a hearing. Because teachers are being terminated through a
10 Information on the Value-Added Metric, CHICAGO PUB. SCH. (Sep. 20,
2013), http://www.cps.edulPages/valueadded.aspx.
11 RACE TO THE Top SCORING RUBRIC, supra note 9, § IV(D)(2)(ii), (iii).
12 Emanuel's 2014 Budget Speech Includes Warning About Pension Crisis,
CBS CHICAGO (Oct. 23, 2013) available at http://chicago.cbslocal.com/2013/
10/23/emanuels-2014-budget-speech-includes-warning-about-pension-crisis.
13 Approve a Restated Policy on the Layoff of Teachers for Reasons Other
Than Those Within the Scope of Board Policy 504.2, BD. OF EDUC. OF THE
CITY OF CHICAGO RES. 11-0622-POl (June 22, 2011).
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layoff rather than the traditional dismissal hearing process, they
are deprived of any opportunity to point out error, offer proof
of mitigating circumstances, or prove pretext in the justification
for layoffs.
Since 2010, CPS has conducted several rounds of large-scale
layoffs pursuant to a policy that calls for "unsatisfactory" rated
tenured teachers to be selected for layoff before all other teach-
ers.14 Tenured teachers laid-off in Chicago because of the poor
performance ratings are not notified that their layoff is a re-
sult of their performance and are not given the opportunity for
a hearing to challenge evidence underlying their performance
evaluation results.' 5
This paper analyzes whether layoff policies that prioritize the
selection of teachers based on performance, without providing
notice and the opportunity for a hearing to challenge the basis
of their termination, violates the Fourteenth Amendment due
process guarantee, focusing on CPS as a case study.
BACKGROUND
Government initiatives, such as Race to the Top, have has-
tened the adoption of policies and procedures designed to iden-
tify and quickly remove allegedly "bad" teachers from the
classroom. Illinois' effort to obtain Race to the Top funds began
in 2009 with the passage of the Performance Evaluation Reform
Act ("PERA").16 PERA requires school districts, including
CPS, to incorporate "the use of data and indicators on student
14 Rescind Board Reports 07-1219-PO1, 10-0623-RS32 and 11-0622-POI and
Adopt a New Layoff of Teachers Policy, BD. OF EDUC. OF THE CITY OF CHI-
CAGo RES. 13-0828-PO4 (Aug. 28, 2013); BD. OF EDUC. OF THE CITY OF
CHICAGO RES. 11-0622-PO1, supra note 13; Resolution Amending any and
All Layoff Policies With Respect to Order of Layoff to Comply With Illinois
School Code, BD. OF EDUC. OF THE CITY OF CHICAGO RES. 10-0623-RS32
(June 23, 2010).
15 Id.
16 Ill. Pub. L. No. 96-0861 (2010).
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growth" into teacher performance evaluations." Student growth
is defined as "a demonstrable change in a student or group of
students' knowledge or skills, as evidenced by gain and/or at-
tainment on two or more assessments, between two or more
points in time."18 The data and indicators on student growth are
required to make up a "significant factor" of a teacher's per-
formance evaluation, defined as "at least 30 percent of the per-
formance evaluation rating assigned."19
In 2011, the State of Illinois passed and adopted into law Sen-
ate Bill 7, which codified, in part, changes to the acquisition of
tenure for teachers, the process for teacher dismissal, and CPS's
obligations when conducting layoffs. 20 Teachers who complete
the probationary period, defined as a three or four-year period
of "excellent" or "proficient" performance ratings, respec-
tively,21 cannot "be removed except for cause." 22 During the
probationary period, teachers are employed without any guar-
anteed employment (i.e. probationary teachers are employed at-
will). The post-probationary status of guaranteed employment is
referred to as tenure. While Senate Bill 7 maintained tenure
rights, it also added a provision allowing school districts to "pro-
mulgate rules establishing procedures governing the layoff or
RIF of employees . .. and the weight to be given to any particu-
lar criterion."23 Senate Bill 7 authorized districts to take into ac-
count "qualifications, certifications, experience, performance
ratings or evaluations, and any other factors relating to an em-
ployee's job performance," but does not allow for exclusive reli-
ance on any one factor.24
17 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/24(A)-4(b) (West 2010).
18 ILL. ADMIN. CODE 23 § 50.30.
19 ILL. ADMIN. CODE 23 § 50.110.
20 11H. Pub. L. No. 97-0008 (2011).
21 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/34-84 (West 2011).
22 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/34-85(a) (West 2011).
23 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/34-18(31) (West 2011).
24 Id.
Volume 7, Number 2
A WOLF IN SHEEPS CLOTHINGZ59
Spring 201+
5
Ramamurthy: A Wolf in Sheeps Clothing: Chicago Public Schools' Disguised "For
Published by Via Sapientiae, 2016
DePaul Journal for Social Justice 2+0
The School Code sets forth separate rules on the removal of
CPS tenured teachers "for cause" on the basis of their perform-
ance.2 5 Before a tenured teacher may be removed as a result of
poor performance, the law requires that CPS provide an "unsat-
isfactory" teacher with "90 school days of remediation within
the classroom," unless otherwise provided in a collective bar-
gaining agreement. 26 During the remediation period, the district
must provide the teacher with access to a consulting teacher, 27
multiple evaluations28 and feedback to the teacher concerning
"deficiencies in performance and recommendations for correc-
tion."29 Teachers successfully complete the remediation process,
and are no longer under threat of immediate termination, if they
receive an evaluation rating of at least "satisfactory" or "profi-
cient" at the end of the 90-day period.30 Only after the comple-
tion of remediation period, and then only if the teacher's
performance has not improved, can CPS initiate dismissal pro-
ceedings to terminate a tenured teacher because of her
performance.3'
The School Code sets forth a detailed pre-termination dismis-
sal process through which CPS may move to terminate tenured
teachers due to poor performance. 3 2 Tenured teachers, because
they have completed the probationary period, are guaranteed
that they "shall [not] . . . be removed except for cause." 3 3 To
terminate a teacher for remediable conduct, such as perform-
ance, CPS must provide the teacher with "reasonable warning in
writing, stating specifically the causes that, if not removed, may
result in [dismissal] charges." 34 The 90-day remediation period
25 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/34-85(a) (West 2011).
26 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/24A-5(i) (West 2013).
27 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/24A-5(j) (West 2013).
28 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/24A-5(k) (West 2013).
29 Id.
30 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/24A-5(1) (West 2013).
31 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/24A-5(m) (West 2013).
32 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/34-85(a) (West 2011).
33 Id.
34 Id.
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and written performance ratings constitute sufficient written
warning. If a tenured teacher is rated "unsatisfactory" after the
remediation period, the district may initiate dismissal proceed-
ings by serving the teacher with written charges, specifications,
and notice of the opportunity to be heard at a hearing before a
neutral hearing officer.35
CPS may remove a teacher from active employment prior to
the dismissal hearing, with or without pay, pending the outcome
of the dismissal hearing. 36 Before removing teachers from active
employment CPS provides them a pre-suspension hearing
before a CPS hearing officer, in which "the employee may be
informed of the allegations against him" and the teacher may
"rebut the allegations leveled against him."3 7 The CPS hearing
officer determines whether to suspend the teacher pending the
dismissal hearing.
Teachers are given the opportunity to present evidence and
testimony challenging the basis of the charges and specifications
at the dismissal hearing.38 After the conclusion of the dismissal
hearing, the hearing officer is required to issue "findings of fact
and a recommendation as to whether or not the teacher or prin-
cipal shall be dismissed" to the board of education.39 Based on
the recommendation, the district "shall make a decision as to
whether the teacher. . . shall be dismissed from its employ." 4 0 If
the teacher is dismissed, she may seek judicial review in the
state appellate court.41
35 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/34-85(a)(1) (West 2011).
36 CHICAGO BD. OF EDUC., BOARD RULES, ch. iv § 4-7(a) (2013), available
at http://www.cpsboe.org/content/documents/chapter-iv-august_2013.pdf.
37 Employee Discipline and Due Process Policy for School-Based Union Em-
ployees (Except CTU) BD. OF EDUC. OF THE CITY OF CHICAGO RES. 11-
0622-PO1VI(E)(4) (July 2004).
38 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/34-85(a)(1)-(5) (West 2011).
39 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/34-85(a)(6) (West 2011).
40 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/34-85(a)(7) (West 2011).
41 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/34-85(a)(8) (West 2011).
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In 2010, the Board of Education for the City of Chicago
("Chicago BOE"), the Board of CPS, altered its internal policies
for conducting layoffs. That year, the Chicago BOE announced
a possible $900 million budget deficit.42 In an effort to reduce
the budget shortfall, the school district announced a reduction in
teaching staff, including roughly 1,200 teachers.43 In June 2010,
the Chicago BOE adopted a resolution that, for the first time,
allowed CPS to lay off teachers on a basis other than years of
service.44 Instead of seniority, the resolution set forth a perform-
ance-prioritized layoff policy. The policy specified that qualified
teachers "under remediation" would be the first selected for lay-
off followed immediately by the termination of teachers "whose
last performance rating was "unsatisfactory," "does not meet ex-
pectations" or an equivalent rating indicating deficient
performance.45
In 2011, the Chicago BOE announced a budget shortfall of
nearly $720 million.46 In June 2011, the Chicago BOE reiterated
its new performance-prioritized layoff policy, setting forth a cat-
egory-by-category order for teacher layoffs.47 The policy stated
that for teachers bearing appropriate certifications, the first
teachers to be selected for termination in an economic layoff
were those "whose last performance rating was 'unsatisfactory,'
'does not meet expectations' or an equivalent rating indicating
deficient performance or who is under remediation."48 The pol-
42 Top CPS officials outline steps the District is taking to cope with its finan-
cial challenges, CHICAGO PUB. SCH. (Feb. 25, 2010), available at http://cps.
edulNews/Pressreleases/Pages/02_25 2010 PR1.aspx.
43 Noreen S. Ahmed-Ullah & Kim Geiger, CPS Lays Off More Than 2,000,
Including 1,000 Teachers, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, July 19, 2013.
44 BD. OF EDUC. OF THE CITY OF CHICAGO RES. 10-0623-RS32, supra note
14.
45 Id.
46 See Noreen S. Ahmed-Ullah, Chicago Public Schools to Cut Central Of-
fice's Budget by $75 Million, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, June 3, 2011.
47 BD. OF EDUC. OF THE CITY OF CHICAGO RES. 11-0622-PO1, supra note
13.
48 Id.
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icy did not allow for teachers to complete the remediation pe-
riod prior to being selected for layoff. The policy did not require
CPS to give notice to selected tenured teachers, the opportunity
for teachers to respond to their selection for termination on the
basis of performance, or an opportunity to challenge the under-
lying basis for their selection in an adversarial proceeding before
or after the termination.49
In 2012, the Chicago BOE and the Chicago Teachers Union
("CTU") agreed to incorporate the performance-prioritized lay-
off policy into its collective bargaining agreement.5 0 While the
policy requires CPS to provide "Notice of Position Closing," the
provision does not require CPS to set forth the basis for the
teacher's selection .' To date, no court has determined whether
the performance-prioritized layoff policy, which does not in-
clude notice or a pre-termination hearing, violates the due pro-
cess guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment.
49 Id.
50 The agreement and incorporation of the layoff policy into the Collective
Bargaining Agreement between the district and the teachers union does not
appear to waive a union member's individual right to challenge the policy, as
the Court has ruled that a Union cannot waive a member's constitutional
rights. See Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 282 n.8 (1986)
(holding, with regards to an individual's constitutional right to Equal Protec-
tion "[tihe Constitution does not allocate constitutional rights to be distrib-
uted like a bloc grant . . . and until it does petitioners' . . . union colleagues
cannot vote away petitioners' rights"); Domka v. Portage Cnty., 523 F.3d 776,
781-782 (7th Cir. 2008) (describing how to waive procedural due process
rights, an individual must provide knowing and voluntary waiver).
51 BD. OF EDUC. OF THE CITY OF CHICAGO RES. 13-0828-PO4, supra note
14.
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DISCUSSION
I. THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT'S DUE
PROCESS GUARANTEE
The Fourteenth Amendment sets forth that no State shall "de-
prive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law."52 This invaluable guarantee applies both substantively
and procedurally. Substantive due process refers to an individ-
ual's "heightened protection against government interference
with certain fundamental rights and liberty interests,"53 and its
implications are not addressed in this article.54
Procedural due process "refers to the procedures that the gov-
ernment must follow before it deprives a person of life, liberty,
or property" and is guaranteed whenever an individual has an
acquired interest in liberty or property.55 At a minimum, proce-
dural due process requires the government to provide (1) "no-
tice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to
apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and af-
ford them an opportunity to present their objections;"S6 (2) a
meaningful hearing offering the recipient "an effective opportu-
nity to defend by confronting any adverse witnesses and by
presenting his own arguments and evidence orally;"5 7 and (3) an
52 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
53 Wash. v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997)
54 A weighty issue not addressed here is whether termination on the basis of
performance, pursuant to performance prioritized layoffs, without an oppor-
tunity for the teacher to challenge the basis for the termination, "implicate
liberty interests in imposing on the discharged employee a stigma of incom-
petence or wrongdoing that forecloses 'his freedom to take advantage of
other employment opportunities."' Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 214
(1974) (Marshall, J. dissenting) (citing Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564,
573 (1972)).
5s See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW PRINCIPLES AND POLI-
CIES (3d ed. 2006).
56 Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950).
57 Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 268 (1970).
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impartial decision maker.58 The exact process owed, however, is
determined case-by-case.59
Not all property interests trigger constitutional due process
protection. Instead, "the Fourteenth Amendment's procedural
protection of property is a safeguard of the security of interests
that a person has already acquired in specific benefits." 60 In its
seminal procedural due process ruling, Roth v. Bd. of Regents,
the Court explained that "specific benefits" refers to property
rights for which individuals have "a legitimate claim of entitle-
ment."6 1 Constitutionally protected property interests "are cre-
ated and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or
understandings that stem from an independent source such as
state law- rules or understandings that secure certain benefits
and that support claims of entitlement to those benefits." 62 In
addition to state law, a "clearly implied promise of continued
employment" from the state may also give rise to procedural
due process protections.63
In Perry v. Sniderman, the Court expanded the definition of
property interests, holding "'property interests subject to proce-
dural due process protection are not limited by a few rigid, tech-
nical forms. Rather, 'property' denotes a broad range of
interests that are secured by 'existing rules or understand-
ings."64 An individual's "broad range of interests" is established
by "rules or mutually explicit understandings that support his
claim of entitlement to the benefit and that he may invoke at a
58 See Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 557 (2003); Mackey v. Montrym, 443
U.S. 1, 29 (1979) (Stewart, J. dissenting); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 271
(1970).
59 See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334 (1976) ([Djue process . . . is
not a technical conception with a fixed content unrelated to time, place and
circumstances, . . . [but rather] is flexible and calls for such procedural protec-
tions as the particular situation demands.)
60 Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 576 (1972).
61 Id.at 577.
62 Id.
63 Id. at 577 (citing Connell v. Higginbotham, 403 U.S. 207, 208 (1971)).
64 Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 601 (1972).
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hearing." 65 For instance, the Court held, a written contract with
a government entity explicitly enumerating the property interest
was sufficient to invoke the due process protections guaranteed
by the Fourteenth Amendment. 66
Since its rulings in Roth and Perry, the Court has adopted a
more limited scope of protected interests. In Bishop v. Wood,
the Court required that protected interests be rooted in state
law, holding that "the claim of entitlement must be decided by
reference to state law." 6 7 In Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales,
the Court further narrowed the parameters of a constitutionally
protected entitlement, adding the limitation that "a benefit is
not a protected entitlement if government officials may grant or
deny it in their discretion."68
In Gonzales, the Court addressed whether Colorado state law
entitled citizens to enforcement of a restraining order as a prop-
erty right. 69 The Court held that even if Colorado law created a
personal entitlement to enforcing a restraining order, "it is by no
means clear that an individual entitlement to enforcement of a
restraining order could constitute a 'property' interest for pur-
poses of the Due Process Clause."70 The explanation seems at
odds with Roth and Perry, which held that the state or a munici-
pality, rather than the Constitution, created a property interest.
The decision professed a more restrictive understanding of con-
stitutional property rights than Bishop, which required only ref-
erence to state law.
The Gonzales Court justified its holding by finding, first, that
the asserted property interest had "no ascertainable monetary
value."71 Second, the Court determined that the asserted prop-
65 Id.
66 Id. at 62.
67 Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 344 (1976).
68 Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 756 (2005) (citing Ky.
Dep't of Corrections v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 462-463 (1989)).
69 Id. at 750-51.
70 Id. at 766.
71 Id.
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erty interest did not "resemble any traditional conception of
property." 7 2 While the Court acknowledged that "traditional
conceptions of property" did not limit the ability of a state to
create a personal entitlement, it held that a protected interest
cannot arise incidentally "out of a function that government ac-
tors have always performed." In Gonzales, the government
function at issue was the municipality's historically assumed au-
thority to make arrests pursuant to a finding of probable cause
to believe an individual had committed crimes.73
From Gonzales, it appears that, in addition to state-created
personal entitlement, courts will also consider whether the pur-
ported interest has monetary value, whether it has historically
been considered a property interest protected by the Constitu-
tion and whether a state creates the right incidentally or inten-
tionally. Guaranteed government employment, as explained
infra, satisfies even the most strict interpretation of Gonzales, as
it has monetary value, has historically been considered a prop-
erty interest and, in the case of guaranteed employment, is ex-
pressly protected by state law.
H. GUARANTEED PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT IS A PROTECTED
PROPERTY INTEREST
In 1952, the Supreme Court first recognized that government
employees have a property interest in guaranteed employment,
which requires the government to provide due process to em-
ployees when depriving them of employment7 4 In Weiman v.
Updegraff, faculty and staff of the Oklahoma Agricultural and
Mechanical College challenged an Oklahoma statute requiring
that all state employees take a loyalty oath stating that they had
not been members of Communist or otherwise subversive orga-
72 Id.
73 Id. at 767.
74 Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952)
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nizations.75 The Court held that "[w]e need not pause to con-
sider whether an abstract right to public employment exists. It is
sufficient to say that constitutional protection does extend to the
public servant whose exclusion pursuant to a statute is patently
arbitrary or discriminatory."76
Four years later, the Court in Slochower held that the termi-
nation of a state college employee for refusing to answer ques-
tions by a federal legislative committee concerning his
communist affiliation, without an opportunity to challenge the
dismissal, was a violation of the Due Process clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment.77 There, a New York City college professor
challenged a New York City municipal statute allowing the city
to summarily terminate employees who asserted their Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination to answer a
question relating to their official conduct.78 The Court explained
that to terminate a government employee, "the State must con-
form to the requirements of due process," being notice and an
opportunity for a hearing to challenge the basis for a termina-
tion.79 The Court held that with respect to the professor,
"[t]here has not been the 'protection of the individual against
arbitrary action,' which Mr. Justice Cardozo characterized as the
very essence of due process."80
While the Constitution does not guarantee a public employee
the right to retain his position, due process must be afforded to
allow employees to challenge their terminations. The Court in
Slochower stated:
The State has broad powers in the selection and
discharge of its employees, and it may be that
75 Id.
76 Id. at 192.
77 Slochower v. Bd. of Higher Educ., 350 U.S. 551 (1956).
78 Id.
79 Id. at 556.
80 Id. at 559 (citing Ohio Bell Tel. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 301 U.S. 292,
302 (1937)).
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proper inquiry would show Slochower's continued
employment to be inconsistent with a real interest
of the State. But there has been no such inquiry
here. We hold that the summary dismissal of ap-
pellant violates due process of law.81
Later, the Court in Roth, while establishing the "individual
entitlement" standard for the establishment of property inter-
ests, stated outright that public employment guaranteed by law
or promise is a property interest afforded due process protec-
tion.82 The Court's subsequent rulings in Perry and Bishop rein-
forced its holding in Roth.
In 1985, the Court explicitly held that a property interest ex-
ists in tenure when granted by state statute or municipal ordi-
nance. 83 In Loudermill, two former employees of the Cleveland
Board of Education challenged their employer's failure to pro-
vide them notice and a hearing prior to termination, despite
having achieved tenure under Ohio state law.84 The Court held
that "[t]he tenured public employee is entitled to oral or written
notice of the charges against him, an explanation of the em-
ployer's evidence, and an opportunity to present his side of the
story" before being terminated.85 The employee was also enti-
tled by the Fourteenth Amendment to a full post-termination
adversarial proceeding to challenge the basis for his termina-
tion.86 Since Loudermill, courts continue to find a property in-
terest in tenured employment.87
81 Id.
82 Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. at 577.
83 Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985).
84 Id.
85 Id. at 546.
86 Id. at 546-47.
87 See, e.g., Univ. of Pittsburgh v. United States, 507 F.3d 165, 176 (3d Cir.
Pa. 2007); Mitchell v. Fankhauser, 375 F.3d 477, 480 (6th Cir. 2004); Darr v.
Town of Telluride, 495 F.3d 1243, 1251 (10th Cir. 2007)
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III. "LAYOFFS" Do NOT NECESSARILY EXTINGUISH DUE
PROCESS GUARANTEES
The Fourteenth Amendment's due process guarantee protects
public employees-who have been granted tenure rights by
state statute or promise-from termination without due process.
A question therefore arises as to whether tenured public em-
ployees must be afforded due process when confronted with the
most common form of termination - layoffs.
A property interest protected by due process only exists when
conferred by the state.88 Thus, tenured public employees are
only guaranteed due process protection in the face of a layoff if
such a right is conferred by the state. Not surprisingly, states
granting tenure to public employees through statute, like Illi-
nois, also have laws allowing the state to layoff employees.89 In
essence, states have limited the scope of a public employee's
property interest in their position. Where public employees are
terminated under the auspices of a "layoff," courts have found
that state statutes allowing for such layoffs extinguish the em-
ployees' property interest and due process protections. 90
88 See Bishop v. Wood, supra note 65, at 344.
89 See 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/34-18(31) (West 2011).
90 Gunville v. Walker, 583 F.3d 979, 989 (7th Cir. 2009); Whalen v. Mass.
Trial Ct., 397 F.3d 19, 25 (1st Cir. 2005) ("[W]e have recognized a limited
'reorganization exception' to due process that eliminates the need for a hear-
ing where a reorganization or other cost-cutting measure results in the dis-
missal of an employee."); Christophel v. Kukulinsky, 61 F.3d 479, 486 (6th
Cir. 1995); UDC Chairs Chapter, Am. Assoc. of Univ. Professors v. Bd. of
Trustees, 312 U.S. App. D.C. 399, 56 F.3d 1469, 1474 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (ex-
plaining that lay-offs are less stigmatizing because "the individual characteris-
tics, qualifications or reputations of the [employees] are not at issue."); Misek
v. City of Chicago, 783 F.2d 98, 100-101 (7th Cir. 1986); Mayfield v. Kelly,
801 F. Supp. 795, 798 (D.D.C. 1992) ("A [reduction in force] clearly does not
raise the same due process concerns that are raised by for-cause dismissals.");
Baker v. Civil Serv. Comm'n of W. Va., 161 W. Va. 666, 245 S.E. 2d 908, 912
(W. Va. 1978) ("Where a classified position has been abolished, the employee
ordinarily is not entitled to a procedural due process hearing."); Powell v.
Jones, 56 Ill. 2d 70, 305 N.E. 2d 166, 172 (Ill. 1973) ("[T]he qualitative differ-
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These cases do not, however, foreclose the possibility that a
termination pursuant to a perceived layoff may implicate due
process protections. The key issue is whether the selection of
teachers to be terminated in a layoff requires individualized de-
terminations by the government employer. Where selection
does require individualized determinations, the terminations are
not "layoffs" in the traditional sense and, thus, require that em-
ployees be afforded due process protections.91 In Lalvani v.
Cook County, Ill., the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
held that "[a] government cannot avoid its procedural obliga-
tions if it is picking specific individuals for layoff or termination,
nor can it use a RIF to conceal a for-cause dismissal and thereby
deprive a career employee of the procedural protections to
which she would otherwise be entitled." 9 2
The plaintiff in Lalvani-a social worker employed by the
county-was terminated in a RIF. State law guaranteed that the
plaintiff could not be terminated except "for cause," granting
the plaintiff a property interest in his employment and due pro-
cess protections of notice and opportunity for a hearing. Plain-
tiff claimed that, contrary to the county's position, his
termination was based on an individualized determination and,
thus, "for cause." First, the court found the state statute created
a property interest in the plaintiff's position.93 Next, the court
addressed the trial court's position that only minimal process is
owed where an employee is terminated in a government RIF.
The court held "the mere intonation of the acronym 'RIF' does
not have such a sweeping constitutional effect." 9 4 The court con-
ences between layoff and discharge are such that variances in procedure are
constitutionally permissible.").
91 See Hanford Exec. Mgmt. Emp. Ass'n v. City of Hanford, 2012 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 112444 (E.D. Cal. 2012); Acevedo-Concepcion v. Irizarry-Mendez,
2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 150108, at *14-15 (D.P.R. 2011); Connolly v. City of
Rutland, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94978, at *35-36 (D. Vt. 2011); Goetz v. City
of Springfield, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80187 (C.D. Ill. 2007).
92 Lalvani v. Cook Cnty., Ill, 269 F.3d 785, 793 (7th Cir. 2001).
93 Id at 792-793.
94 Id.
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sidered testimony that the employer "was dissatisfied with
Lalvani's performance as an employee" as evidence of "pretext
for the termination of a career employee without providing
Lalvani an opportunity to rebut the allegations of bad
performance. "95
Courts have upheld employees' due process rights where gov-
ernment employers disguised performance-based terminations
as "layoffs."9 6 In Goetz, a district court reviewed a city's deci-
sion to terminate a plaintiff in a "layoff." The plaintiff was an
accounts manager for the city's Department of Public Utilities.
The court found that because the plaintiff could only be termi-
nated "for cause" pursuant to state law, she had an established
property interest in her position.97 In response to the city's argu-
ment that the plaintiff admitted to being terminated pursuant to
a "layoff" and, thus, was not entitled to due process protections,
the court held that "[t]his contention is without merit."98 The
court went on to explain:
[W]hile Plaintiff states several times in her Com-
plaint that she was "laid off," she also alleges facts
supporting her underlying claim that the layoff
was a mere cover for an improper discharge. If
such allegations are true, Plaintiff would be enti-
tled to additional due process rights above and be-
yond those given to employees laid off for
economic reasons.99
Lalvani and Goetz stand for the proposition that termination
under the auspices of "layoff" or "reductions in force" do not
settle the question of whether due process rights are afforded to
tenured public employees. Instead, the critical fact is the under-
95 Id.
96 See Goetz v. City of Springfield, 2007 U.S Dist. LEXIS 80187; Land v. Bd.
of Educ., 325 Ill. App. 3d 294 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001).
97 See Goetz, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80187 at 9.
98 Id. at 10.
99 Id.
Volume 7, Number 2
Z52
Spring Z0l4
18
DePaul Journal for Social Justice, Vol. 7, Iss. 2 [2016], Art. 5
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jsj/vol7/iss2/5
lying cause of the termination. In particular, the opinions sug-
gest that where a tenured public employee is selected for
termination, whether in a layoff or otherwise, because of his/her
performance or other deficiency, the termination is "for cause,"
triggering Fourteenth Amendment due process protections.
Such analysis requires courts to look beneath labels and ex-
amine the underlying motives for the termination of a public
employee. Like the ravening wolves in sheep's clothing, the true
nature of the termination is only revealed by the district's ac-
tions not its words.
IV. PERFORMANCE-PRIORITIZED LAYOFFS ARE DISGUISED
"FOR CAUSE" TERMINATIONS
Countervailing justifications form the basis for Chicago's per-
formance-prioritized layoff policy that must be weighed to de-
termine the scope of due process protections guaranteed to
tenured teachers terminated as a result of the policy. On the one
hand, the catalyst for large-scale RIFs is a lack of funds. Whole-
sale reductions affect hundreds of teachers across schools,
grades, subjects, and specialties. Sweeping layoffs resulting from
reduced funds do not require school districts to conduct individ-
ualized assessments to determine which teachers will ultimately
be terminated. Instead, factors, such as years of service, may be
used. A district could also choose to select teachers at random.
Such layoffs, where teachers are not selected based on an indi-
vidualized assessment, do not trigger the notice and hearing re-
quirements of the due process guarantee.
Performance-prioritized layoffs, however, add a second basis
for a teacher's layoff selection. Chicago's layoff policy sets forth
a hierarchy of teachers subject to termination if the district
chooses to conduct layoffs. 10o At the top of the hierarchy are
qualified teachers who have received poor performance evalua-
100 BD. OF EDUC. OF THE CITY OF CHICAGO RES. 13-0828-PO4, supra note
14.
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tions.o1 As a consequence of the policy teachers who have re-
ceived poor performance evaluations are the first qualified
teachers to be selected for termination in a layoff. The assess-
ment of which teachers will be selected for termination under
the policy inherently requires individualized assessment of
teachers' performances and comparison of teachers' perform-
ances to that of their colleagues.
In a performance-prioritized layoff system, then, two bases
exist for a teacher's termination - economic exigency and
teacher performance. The determination of which factor is the
proximate cause of the teacher's termination is, in all likelihood,
dispositive on the issue of whether performance-prioritized lay-
offs trigger due process protections. If economic exigency is the
proximate cause, the strong body of case law exempting layoffs
from due process protections would release CPS from having to
provide constitutional procedural safeguards.10 2 If, on the other
hand, a teacher's performance is the proximate cause of her se-
lection for termination, such an individualized determination
necessarily implicates a property interest and, thus, requires
constitutional due process protections.103
In the case of economic layoffs, the district may argue that the
teacher would not have been terminated but for the lack of suf-
ficient funds. This, however, does not end the discussion. While
a teacher would not have been terminated but for the budget
shortfall, the reverse is also true: a budget shortfall alone does
not necessitate the termination of a particular teacher. Instead,
10 Id.
102 See generally Gunville, 583 F.2d 979, 989 (7th Cir. 2009); Whalen, 397
F.3d 19, 25 (1st Cir. 2005); Christophel, 61 F.3d 479, 486 (6th Cir. 1995); UDC
Chairs Chapter, Am. Assoc. of Univ. Professors, 312 U.S. App. D.C. 399
(D.C. Cir. 1995); Misek, 783 F.2d 98, 100-01 (7th Cir. 1986); Mayfield, 801
F.Supp 795, 798 (D.C. Dist. Ct. 1992); Baker, 245 S.E. 2d 908, 912 (W. Va.
1978); Powell, 56 Ill. 2d 70 (Ill. 1973).
103 See Lalvani, 269 F.3d 785, 793; see also Hanford Exec. Mgmt. Emp. Ass'n,
2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 112444; Aceved-Concepcion, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
150108; Connolly, 2011 U.D. Dist. LEXIS 94978; Goetz, 2007 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 80187.
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it is the criteria on which the district relies to select particular
teachers after it has determined that it must terminate a certain
percentage of its staff that forms the most proximate basis for
the termination of an individual.
By way of example, in a district employing 100 teachers and
forced to terminate 10% of its teaching staff as a result of
budget shortfalls, the fact that ten teachers will be terminated
does not, alone, identify which of the 100 teachers will be laid
off. In a district relying upon the traditional selection criterion
of seniority, the ten teachers with the fewest years of service will
be selected for layoff. Thus, the proximate cause for the termi-
nation of the ten teachers is not the budget shortfall itself but
the policy setting forth years of service as the selection criterion.
In the 100-teacher district suffering from budget shortfalls, the
application of a performance-prioritized layoff policy would re-
quire the district to select the ten poorest performing teachers,
based on their performance evaluations. Just as in the previous
example, the proximate cause for the termination of the ten se-
lected teachers is not the budget shortfall but the policy requir-
ing termination of the lowest performing teachers. Indeed, the
ten lowest performing teachers may be the ten most senior
teachers, making it clear that, had a different criterion been
used such as years of service, none would have been terminated.
Said another way, when a district endeavors to cut deficits by
conducting a layoff, some teachers will most certainly be termi-
nated due to budget deficits or other economic concerns; it is
the decision to choose which teachers will be laid-off that impli-
cates due process rights. In Chicago, performance is the proxi-
mate cause for the selection of the first qualified tenured
teachers to be laid off. The Illinois School Code mandates that
tenured teachers terminated on the basis of performance be af-
forded dismissal-hearing procedures set forth therein,104 and
104 See 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/24A-5(m) (West 2013); 105 ILL. COMP.
STAT. ANN. 5/34-85 (West 2011).
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states that termination on the basis of performance is considered
a "for cause" termination. Under this analysis, the performance-
prioritized layoff policy triggers due process protections for ten-
ured teachers selected for termination because of their poor per-
formance evaluations.
V. TENURED TEACHERS ARE OWED SUBSTANTIAL DUE
PROCESS WHEN SELECTED FOR TERMINATION
PURSUANT TO THE PERFORMANCE-
PRIORITIZED LAYOFF POLICY
Mathews v. Eldridge and Its Progeny
If tenured teachers selected for termination on the basis of
their performance pursuant to the Board's layoff policy are
owed Due Process, the next inquiry is what process is owed.
Specifically, the following must be answered: what type of notice
is to be given; must the hearing be provided before or after the
deprivation; what are the procedures for the hearing, including
on whom the burden of proof rests, the standard of such proof;
and, who is the ultimate arbiter.
In Mathews v. Eldridge, the Court set forth the following
three-factor balancing test, intended to help guide courts to an
ultimate determination of what process should be given when
due process rights are implicated:
First, the private interest that will be affected by
the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous
deprivation of such interest through the proce-
dures used, and the probable value, if any, of addi-
tional or substitute procedural safeguards and
finally, the Government's interest, including the
function involved and the fiscal and administrative
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burdens that the additional of substitute procedu-
ral requirement would entail.105
The "private interest" refers to the interest of the individual
affected by the government deprivation.106 The more highly val-
ued interests, in the eyes of the court, command more substan-
tial procedural safeguards. The second factor refers to the
court's assessment of how valuable additional procedures will be
to determining the voracity of the government's decisions.o7
When a teacher is terminated on the basis of performance, for
instance, the court will determine how valuable additional pro-
cedures may be to determine the accuracy of a teacher's per-
formance rating and whether that was the true motivation
underlying the termination. The third factor concerns the bur-
den to the government in providing the additional procedures
relative to the Government's interest in pursuing the depriva-
tion.os The Court in Mathews instructed that no factor is dispos-
itive and that each must be assessed to determine the
procedures the Government must provide.109 The factors are as-
sessed on a case-by-case basis, leaving courts with broad discre-
tion to fashion due process procedures tailored to the particular
deprivation at issue.
While the Court has not addressed the process owed to teach-
ers deprived of a property interest in tenured employment as a
result of performance-prioritized layoffs, it has applied the Ma-
thews factors in cases involving deprivation of government em-
ployment. An analysis of these cases establishes the framework
within which to determine the process owed to teachers termi-
nated as a result of performance-prioritized layoffs.
In Loudermill, the Court took its first opportunity to apply
the Mathews balancing test in the context of procedural due pro-
105 See Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335.
106 See Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 543.
107 Id.
108 Id. at 544; See also Mathews, 424 U.S. at 347.
109 Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335.
Volume 7, Number 2 Spring 201+
257 A WOLP IN SHEEPS CLOTHING
23
Ramamurthy: A Wolf in Sheeps Clothing: Chicago Public Schools' Disguised "For
Published by Via Sapientiae, 2016
DePaul Journal for Social Justice
cess rights afforded to government employees. Importantly, the
Court determined "the significance of the private interest in re-
taining employment cannot be gainsaid. We have frequently rec-
ognized the severity of depriving a person of the means of
livelihood."'1o Concurring with the Court's opinion, Justice Mar-
shall went further, stating emphatically "I cannot and will not
close my eyes today - as I could not 10 years ago - to the
economic situation of great numbers of public employees, and
to the potentially traumatic effect of a wrongful discharge on a
working person."I'
In assessing the second factor, the weight to be given the po-
tential for erroneous deprivation and the value of additional
safeguards, the Court held:
[S]ome opportunity for the employee to present
his side of the case is recurringly of obvious value
in reaching an accurate decision. Dismissals 'for
cause' will often involve factual disputes. Even
where the facts are clear, the appropriateness or
necessity of the discharge may not be; in such
cases, the only meaningful opportunity to invoke
the discretion of the decision maker is likely to be
before the termination takes effect.' 12
The Court determined, unequivocally, that some procedures
must exist for a tenured government employee to challenge a
"for cause" termination.
Finally, the Court compared the government's interest in ter-
minating deficient employees to the property interests held by
the employees. The Court found that "[t]he governmental inter-
est in immediate termination does not outweigh these interests"
and that "affording the employee an opportunity to respond
110 See Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 543.
11 Id. at 551.
112 Id. at 543 (internal citations omitted).
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prior to termination would impose neither a significant adminis-
trative burden nor intolerable delays." 13
Ultimately, in balancing each of the Mathews factors, the
Court determined that tenured employees were entitled to at
least the following procedures prior to a "for cause" termina-
tion: (1) "oral or written notice of the charges against him," 114
(2) "an explanation of the employer's evidence,"" 5 (3) "a pre-
termination opportunity to respond" to the charges and evi-
dence against him,1 6 and (4) a post-termination administrative
hearing to challenge the evidence supporting his termination,
before a neutral arbiter, as set forth by state law."7
The Court limited the scope of pre-termination procedures
available to tenured government employees because of the ex-
tensive post-termination adversarial procedures available to the
Plaintiff to challenge his termination in that case. Thus, the
Court held the right to employment did not invoke that kind of
immediate harm necessitating "a full adversarial evidentiary
hearing prior to adverse governmental action."118 The Court
reasoned that the pre-termination procedures need only be "an
initial check against mistaken decisions," allowing the employee
to fully challenge the termination in a post-termination adver-
sarial proceeding. 19 The Court acknowledged the Government's
interest, explaining that "to require more than this prior to ter-
mination would intrude to an unwarranted extent on the gov-
ernment's interest in quickly removing an unsatisfactory
employee."120
Importantly, in defining the post-termination due process pro-
tections guaranteed to tenured government employees, the
113 Id. at 544.
114 Id. at 546.
115 Id.
116 Id. at 547.
117 Id. at 546-47.
11s Id. at 545.
119 Id. at 546.
120 Id.
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Court looked first to the state's procedures. So long as the state
procedures were sufficient to meet the constitutional threshold
of notice, opportunity for a hearing, and before a neutral arbi-
ter, the Court deferred to the state to create the post-termina-
tion procedural paradigm.121
In a second case applying the Mathews factors to government
employment, Gilbert v. Homar, the Court grappled with the
procedural due process rights owed to a tenured government
employee who had been suspended pursuant to an executive or-
der from the Governor of Pennsylvania.122 The executive order
stated that state employees are to be suspended without pay "as
soon as practicable after being charged with ... a felony." 23 The
case, though not addressing due process rights in the context of
a termination, nonetheless offers further insight into the Court's
application of Mathews.
Before addressing the Mathews factors, the Court explained
its case-by-case approach to determining the procedural scope
of the Fourteenth Amendment's due process guarantee. 124 The
Court will give deference to government employers, as it ex-
plained, "where a State must act quickly, or where it would be
impractical to provide predeprivation process, postdeprivation
process satisfies the requirements of the Due Process Clause."125
Though acknowledging a state's interest in acting quickly, the
Court reasserted the strong interest employees have in their po-
sitions and "the severity of depriving someone of the means of
his livelihood."126 In assessing the risk of erroneous deprivation
and value of additional procedures, in the context of suspension,
the Court held that pre-deprivation hearings are only reasona-
ble to "assure that there are reasonable grounds to support" the
121 Id. at 546-47.
122 Gilbert v. Homar, 520 U.S. 924 (1997).
123 Id. at 933 (internal citations omitted).
124 Id. at 930.
125 Id.
126 Id. at 932.
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deprivation.127 Because the suspension of the plaintiff was a di-
rect result of a felony indictment, the Court determined that the
fact of the arrest and filing of criminal charges against the em-
ployee served as sufficient pre-suspension proof and obviated
the need for a pre-suspension hearing.128 Finally, the Court de-
termined "the State has a significant interest in immediately sus-
pending" employees "when felony charges are filed against
them."129
In weighing the Mathews factors, the Court held that the em-
ployee was not entitled to a pre-deprivation hearing. The Court
did, however, acknowledge the employee's likely right to a post-
deprivation hearing.
The Loudermill and Gilbert Courts both found that employ-
ment is a valuable right that, when guaranteed, cannot be de-
prived without affording the employee some procedural
safeguards. While dealing with varying degrees of deprivation,
the Court's opinions also give deference to the government's in-
terest in terminating certain employees due to their deficiencies,
as in Loudermill, or their actions, as in Gilbert. Importantly, in
both opinions, the Court grounds its findings in the language of
state statutes or orders. In Loudermill, for example, the Court
defers to Ohio's post-deprivation procedures as sufficient to
provide constitutional due process safeguards.130 Likewise in
Gilbert, the Court defers to the Pennsylvania criminal courts as
providing sufficient pre-deprivation due process to limit the
need for any other procedures prior to a suspension.'3' The
Court's framework established by these decisions guides the de-
termination of what process is owed to Chicago tenured teach-
ers selected for layoff on the basis of their performance.
127 Id. at 933.
128 Id. at 934.
129 Id. at 932.
130 Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 546-47.
131 Gilbert, 520 U.S. at 934.
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Application of the Mathews Factors to
Chicago's Layoff Policy
The weight given to the first Mathews factor, the property in-
terest in tenured employment, is settled as a matter of law. Ten-
ured teachers employed by CPS are guaranteed permanent
employment terminable only "for cause" as set forth in the Illi-
nois School Code, thus creating a property interest in their posi-
tions.132 This interest in employment weighs heavily in the
Mathews balancing test. Whether fired or laid off, tenured
teachers terminated from their positions have been deprived of
a valuable property interest as reiterated in Loudermill and
Gilbert.
Turning to the second factor, a dismissal on a "for cause" ba-
sis, such as performance, will undoubtedly invoke challenges
from a teacher asserting his or her proficiency.'13 Complicating
the constitutional issue in Chicago is a paradigm for a corrective
"remediation" process set forth in the School Code and afforded
to "unsatisfactory" tenured teachers prior to termination.134 This
"remediation" process requires CPS schools to provide a ten-
ured teacher rated "unsatisfactory" 90 days in which to raise the
level of his performance from "unsatisfactory" to "satisfactory"
or "proficient."135 During this 90-day period, the school district
must also provide a consulting teacher and substantive feedback
to the teacher describing where he can improve his perform-
ance. 136 The remediation process serves a two-fold purpose: first,
it satisfies the School Code's mandate that a teacher be given an
opportunity to correct remediable behavior before being sub-
jected to dismissal proceedings; and, second, it provides tenured
teachers with a pre-termination process to challenge the validity
of an initial "unsatisfactory" rating.
132 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/34-85 (West 2011).
133 Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 543.
134 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/24A-5(i) (West 2013).
135 Id.
136 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/24A-5(j) (West 2013).
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Also distinct to CPS is an extensive pre-deprivation adver-
sarial dismissal proceeding before a neutral arbiter, appealable
to the state appellate court, upon the filing of charges by the
school district for termination. 1 Unlike in Loudermill and Gil-
bert where state law set forth extensive post-deprivation proce-
dures allowing the Court to order limited pre-deprivation
procedures, the Illinois School Code only allows tenured teach-
ers to challenge their notice of termination in a pre-termination
adversarial process. 38 In fact, after a termination has been final-
ized, the state statute offers no process whereby a tenured
teacher may challenge the factual basis for the termination.
Illinois' grant of significant pre-termination due process rights
is not required by the Court's holdings in Loudermill and Gil-
bert. By setting forth the remediation and pre-termination pro-
cedures in state law, however, Illinois effectively incorporates
these rights into valuable property interests held by Chicago
tenured teachers. In practical terms, the failure of an Illinois
school district to afford tenured teachers the full 90-day
remediation prior to a termination on the basis of performance
may itself be a deprivation giving rise to due process rights.
Likewise, a school district's failure to afford a teacher a pre-ter-
mination right to challenge the basis for their termination may
constitute a deprivation necessitating due process procedures.
In the context of performance-prioritized layoffs, Chicago
does not require that the remediation process be completed
prior to the selection of "unsatisfactory" tenured teachers for
termination and, in fact, expressly includes teachers who are in
the midst of the remediation process as part of the first group of
qualified teachers to be selected for layoffs.'39 Thus, tenured
teachers in Chicago who have received an initial "unsatisfac-
tory" rating are not guaranteed the full 90-day remediation, as
137 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/34-85 (West 2011).
138 Id.
139 BD. OF EDUC. OF THE CITY OF CHICAGO RES. 13-0828-PO4, supra note
14.
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required by the Illinois School Code, if the district engages in
layoffs prior to the completion of the remediation period. Fail-
ure to provide the full 90-day remediation prior to a perform-
ance-prioritized layoff also deprives tenured teachers of any
opportunity to disagree with the underlying assumption of the
teacher's poor performance or to take corrective action.
Chicago's performance-prioritized layoff policy also does not
require the district to notify tenured teachers that the reason for
their selection is poor performance.14 0 The district may simply
notify a tenured teacher that her termination is the result of an
economic layoff, even when the proximate cause for the selec-
tion of the teacher for termination is her "unsatisfactory" rating.
As a result, teachers are deprived of any knowledge that they
were selected for layoff on the basis of their performance.
Finally, the performance-prioritized layoff policy does not af-
ford a selected tenured teacher the opportunity to challenge the
evidence supporting the performance rating in either a pre- or
post-deprivation hearing.141 Ultimately, in weighing the second
Mathews factor, it is evident that teachers terminated pursuant
to the performance-prioritized layoff policy are afforded little in
the way of constitutionally guaranteed due process rights.
On the other hand, the third Mathews factor requires an anal-
ysis of the district's interest in pursuing performance-prioritized
layoffs. As with "for cause" terminations, a school district has a
strong interest in maintaining its highest performing teachers.
Against the backdrop of a renewed focus on increasing the per-
formance of American students, school districts like Chicago are
under immense pressure to show gains in metrics such as gradu-
ation rate, college acceptance and standardized test scores. The
layoff policy is based on the premise that higher performing
teachers will facilitate better results in each of these metrics.
Also at issue is the fact that school districts, like Chicago, must
140 Id.
141 Id.
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show demonstrable academic achievement in the face of report-
edly severe budget deficits. Faced with the proposition of having
to layoff significant numbers of teachers while at the same time
improve student performance, a policy allowing the selection of
poor-performing teachers to be terminated before all others ap-
pears to satisfy each of these interests.
Put to the scale, the balancing of the Mathews factors does
little to reveal an obvious set of procedures that must be af-
forded to tenured teachers in Chicago prior to a performance-
prioritized layoff. What is abundantly clear, however, is that
these tenured teachers have a valuable property interest in their
employment and should be afforded some due process. At a
minimum, these protections require oral or written notice to
teachers that they have, in fact, been terminated pursuant to the
performance-prioritized layoff policy because of their "unsatis-
factory" rating.142 Loudermill and its progeny require that this
notice must be given prior to the termination of the employee.143
The government's interest in quickly executing financially-in-
duced layoffs does not weigh against an employee's right to re-
spond to the basis of the layoff. Allowing a laid off teacher the
opportunity to present a written response to the district will not
slow down the process of layoffs, nor does it present a heavy
financial or time-consuming burden to the district.
A more nuanced question is whether CPS must allow teachers
to complete the remediation process prior to being selected for
termination pursuant to the layoff policy. The Illinois School
Code guarantees the remediation process without exception,
other than to allow the district and the teachers' bargaining rep-
resentative to agree to distinct remediation procedures.144 CPS
and the CTU have adopted nearly all remediation provisions set
142 Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 544-47.
143 Id. at 544.
144 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/24A-5(i) (West 2013).
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forth in the School Code.1 4 5 The remediation process is also set
forth as an attendant benefit of tenure under state law. Because
state law mandates that a teacher cannot be deprived of her per-
manent employment on the basis of performance prior to the
completion of remediation, CPS's failure to provide an "unsatis-
factory" tenured teacher 90 days to remediate her perform-
ance-a result of CPS's performance-prioritized layoff policy-
is likely a violation of the teacher's due process guarantees.
Therefore, tenured teachers must be given the opportunity to
complete the statutorily proscribed remediation period prior to
their selection for layoff on the basis of their performance.
Even more important is the determination of whether a ten-
ured teacher laid off pursuant to the performance-prioritized
layoff policy, on the basis of an "unsatisfactory" rating, should
be afforded an adversarial proceeding to challenge the suffi-
ciency of the evidence supporting her poor performance evalua-
tion. While courts assessing whether laid off employees have a
right to an adversarial proceeding have generally held that they
do not, CPS's layoff policy bares a unique characteristic impli-
cating stronger due process protections - individualized determi-
nations. Specifically, the selection of teachers pursuant to
Chicago's layoff policy is, in fact, a "for cause" termination on
the basis of performance. The Illinois School Code guarantees
an adversarial process in which tenured teachers terminated
"for cause", including for poor performance, have the opportu-
nity to challenge the evidence supporting the basis for their ter-
mination before a neutral arbiter.146 As with remediation, the
dismissal procedures are set forth in the School Code as an at-
tendant benefit afforded only to tenured teachers. It is clear,
therefore, that some adversarial process should be provided to
145 See AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE BD. OF EDUC. OF THE CITY OF CHICAGO
& CHICAGO TEACHERS UNION LOCAL 1, AM. FED'N OF TEACHERS, AFL-
CIO, Art. 39 (2012).
146 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/34-85 (West 2011).
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tenured teachers selected for termination on the basis of their
performance rating pursuant to Chicago's layoff policy.
The question then becomes whether such an adversarial pro-
ceeding should be provided prior to or after the teacher has
been terminated. In Loudermill the Court determined that the
Fourteenth Amendment required only limited pre-deprivation
procedures so long as the state afforded a more extensive post-
deprivation adversarial proceeding in which the terminated em-
ployee could challenge the basis for the termination.147 The
Court there relied on Ohio's statute setting forth post-depriva-
tion procedures wherein the terminated employee could present
evidence to a neutral arbiter that his termination was im-
proper.148 Courts since, including the Gilbert Court, have also
relied upon extensive post-deprivation procedures set forth in
the relevant state and federal statutes to limit the pre-depriva-
tion rights afforded.
The Illinois School Code does not set forth any post-depriva-
tion due process procedures in which terminated tenured teach-
ers in Chicago can challenge the basis for their termination.
Instead, Illinois has adopted an extensive pre-deprivation "dis-
missal hearing" process, in which CPS teachers may challenge
the charges underlying the basis for their notice of termination
prior to the termination being approved by the Board of Educa-
tion.149 After a teacher takes advantage of these procedures-or
fails to do so-and is terminated, she has no other procedural
recourse through which to challenge the basis for her
termination.xso
Illinois' extensive pre-deprivation procedures, without any
post-deprivation process, eliminate the ability of a reviewing
court to justify a more limited scope of process owed to teachers
laid off on the basis of their performance, as in Loudermill and
147 Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 546-47.
148 Id.
149 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/34-85 (West 2011).
150 Id.
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Gilbert. Illinois must provide an adversarial hearing to teachers
terminated on the basis of their performance pursuant to the
performance-prioritized layoff policy. The School Code man-
dates that such a hearing occur prior to termination. This, of
course, must be balanced with the school district's interest in
reducing budget deficits, which can only occur if teachers se-
lected for layoff are terminated expeditiously.
A reviewing court may determine that the most efficient solu-
tion is to deem the performance-prioritized layoff policy a per se
violation of the due process guarantees of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Such a ruling would not limit the district's ability
to conduct layoffs but would force CPS to select teachers using
non-individualized performance criteria. The benefit of deeming
the policy unconstitutional would be to allow the court to avoid
having to fashion appropriate procedures, which the district may
ultimately choose to ignore in lieu of some other process. A rul-
ing striking down the policy in whole, however, would not ad-
dress the district's concern of retaining high quality teachers
when forced to reduce personnel, as any assessment of teachers'
performance would necessarily require individualized
determinations.
The Illinois School Code does, however, allow a reviewing
court an alternative position. In addition to the extensive pre-
deprivation dismissal hearing process, which CPS has adopted,
the School Code also allows the district to opt out of the statu-
tory procedure and create its own process for the removal of
teachers "for cause," so long as the procedures are entered into
with agreement from the exclusive bargaining representative for
the teachers, the CTU.151 These procedures must, of course,
meet the due process standards set forth in Loudermill and its
progeny. A reviewing court could allow CPS to retain its per-
formance-prioritized layoff policy so long as it receives agree-
ment from the CTU to implement extensive post-deprivation
151 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/34-85c (West 2011).
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due process procedures that allow teachers laid off because of
their performance to challenge the basis for their evaluation in a
post-termination adversarial proceeding. This would address the
countervailing interests identified in an assessment of the Ma-
thews factors.
Under such a proposal, terminated teachers will be entitled to
the completion of the statutory 90-day remediation procedures
and its attendant benefits, such as teacher coaching and periodic
reviews and feedback. Teachers will also be entitled to a limited
pre-deprivation process in the form of notice of their termina-
tion setting forth the basis of their selection for layoff as their
performance and allowing the teacher the opportunity to re-
spond to the district in writing. A high-performing teacher mis-
takenly selected for termination pursuant to the layoff policy,
for instance, will have the opportunity to send documentation to
CPS proving that she had not received "unsatisfactory" per-
formance evaluations and avoid an obviously erroneous termi-
nation. Terminated teachers will have the post-deprivation right
to challenge the validity of their "unsatisfactory" rating in an
adversarial proceeding before a neutral arbiter. Finally, because
the adversarial hearing would occur after the termination, the
district would be allowed to achieve its goal of expeditious lay-
off while retaining its highest performing teachers.
It must be emphasized that the alternative solution could only
be achieved with agreement from the Chicago Teachers Union,
as set forth in the Illinois School Code. Without an agreement
from the Union, the Board is required to provide a pre-depriva-
tion adversarial hearing to all teachers selected for termination
on the basis of their performance pursuant to the layoff policy,
as set forth in the default dismissal process established by the
Illinois School Code. Though such a ruling would hamper the
district's ability to engage in expeditious layoffs, should it
choose to retain the performance-prioritized policy, a mandated
pre-layoff hearing is likely the only mechanism to ensure that
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selected tenured teachers are afforded the due process rights
guaranteed them by the Fourteenth Amendment.
Ultimately, the procedures adopted by a reviewing court must
meet the basic standard of providing sufficient notice and the
opportunity for a hearing before a neutral arbiter. CPS's per-
formance-prioritized layoff policy fails to provide selected ten-
ured teachers with these rights and is thus unconstitutional.
CONCLUSION
Terminations pursuant to CPS's performance-prioritized lay-
offs policy are "for cause" terminations masquerading as layoffs.
While tedious, and perhaps contrary to public opinion, districts
are under a constitutional obligation to provide due process to
tenured teachers selected for layoff on the basis of their per-
formance. CPS's layoff policy runs afoul of this mandate and is
susceptible to constitutional challenge. Employment is firmly es-
tablished as a bedrock right and property interest when guaran-
teed by the state. Individuals rely on government promises of
permanent employment when purchasing homes, starting fami-
lies, and establishing communities. The use of layoffs to conduct
wholesale "for cause" terminations stretches the concept of a
"layoff" beyond recognition. Efforts must be made by districts
employing performance-prioritized layoff policies to alter crite-
ria for layoffs in such a way that either ensure performance is
not dispositive in the selection of teachers for layoff or afford
tenured teachers their full panoply of procedural rights upon
termination. Reviewing courts must not be afraid when
presented with performance-prioritized layoff policies like those
adopted by CPS to enforce the due process requirements of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
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